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1 Introduction
It is widely accepted among scholars in social sciences that the establishment of subna-
tional tiers of government improves the overall economic efficiency in the provision of
public goods or services (Bardhan, 2002).1 Among the most recognized advantages of
decentralization is the higher ability of local government to (i) match public spending to
the heterogeneous preferences of individuals or firms - allocative efficiency - and to (ii)
mobilize underused resources to compete against other local jurisdictions - productive
efficiency (Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). Local governments may for instance
exploit information about territorial conditions, better than the central administration
does, to design innovation policies tailored to the specific needs and demands of local
innovators or to improve the matching between entrepreneurs with innovative business
projects and investors seeking R&D opportunities (Taylor, 2007).
However, there are a number of countervailing factors that may in practice hinder
the achievement of the benefits associated to administrative decentralization. First,
there exist incentives to under-report the true willingness to pay in case people or
companies fear the actual payment of this public provision (Feld et al., 2004). This
argument alone undermines allocative efficiency as the sum of individuals’/firms’ true
marginal willingness to pay could not be possibly equalized to the actual marginal cost
of the public good provision. Second, even if decentralization enhances the matching
of the provision of goods and services to the preferences of the population/firms, local
governments may be less efficient than the central one in delivering such goods and
services due to the loss of economies of scale (Prud’homme, 1995). It is also ques-
tionable that different tiers of government may have similar levels of technical and
administrative capacity. Moreover, and most importantly for our paper, local admin-
istrations are typically weaker and less accountable institutions, with the corruption of
public officials resulting easier compared to the case of the national authority, partic-
ularly when local governments are empowered to allocate resources among individuals
and companies and to bid for greater shares of the national budget (Rodriguez-Pose
1See the landmark contributions due to Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972).
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and Ezcurra, 2010). Therefore, there is scope within local governments for cronyism
and the creation of a system of patronage in the management of public funds to the
detriment of the economic efficiency.
This paper centers around the question of whether mismanagement of local funds
can overturn the recognized advantage of decentralization. The case of Italy is particu-
larly suitable to address this question, not only because Italy has been historically the
host of some of the most influential and powerful criminal organizations worldwide, but
also because - and perhaps this is less known - it has undergone important decentraliza-
tion reforms. Specifically, the combination of the following two events is of particular
interest for our research question. The first one is known as the mafia transplantation
phenomenon (or also the “Northern Passage” of mafia activities), which indicates that
the links between mafia and politics have radicated, from the South of Italy, where
they were rooted in, towards the Northern (and richer) regions, where the infiltration
of criminal organizations was originally absent. The second event is the administrative
reform of the territorial governance that has introduced eight, three, and four new
provinces, respectively, in three subsequent waves of reforms (1992, 2001, and 2004).
These changes in the territorial governance allow us to implement a difference-in-
difference (DID) estimation strategy and therefore to study the effect of decentraliza-
tion on innovation, which we consider as an indirect measure of economic efficiency.
Key to the implementation of this strategy is that our sampling period spans some
years before the first reform (i.e. 1992) through some years after the last reform (i.e.
2004). We proxy innovation output by means of patent applications at the European
Patent Office (EPO) over 1977-2012.2 The use of patents is strongly grounded in the
New Growth Theory that regards the R&D sector as the primary input for innovation
and ultimately as the engine of a sustained economic growth in the long run (Romer,
1990; Lucas, 1988).
In our estimation strategy, we control for province fixed effects and region time-
2The availability of other data informing on the economic activity at the local level is very scant
and certainly does not cover a similarly wide time period. For instance, data on provincial GDP are
available only from 2000 onwards (see Eurostat website).
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varying effects to account for average differences between provinces and idiosyncratic
shocks over time at the regional level, respectively. Additionally, we factor out poten-
tial inter-province spillovers by removing provinces that share borders with the new
established ones, i.e. we remove the bias associated with the reallocation of resources
that may occur among neighbor provinces or due to the province split.
We find evidence of a significantly negative effect of decentralization on innovation.
This detrimental effect is however heterogeneous because it varies by reform wave
and across macro areas in the Italian territory. More specifically, innovation seems to
be significantly hindered mainly in provinces in the Northern-Central regions, which
comprise the more economically active areas of the country. Moreover, the overall
decentralization effect appears to be exclusively driven by the 1992 reform, which is
the wave that introduced the deepest changes in the provincial territory.
Inspired by Buonanno and Pazzona (2014), we relate this finding to the “mafia
transplantation” phenomenon thoroughly documented in Dalla Chiesa (2017). The in-
filtration of criminal organization into the economic and political activities in Northern
Region spurred (partly and unintentionally) from the mandatory resettlement-residence
(“confino”) policy in place until 1970’s, to which highly ranked mafia bosses were sub-
jected to. We therefore collected information on bosses sent in confino (i.e. forced exile)
to identify with reasonable accuracy, on the basis of anti-mafia parliamentary commit-
tee reports, the arrival municipality and associated province of forced exile. The forced
exile of bosses has led to the necessity of recreating criminal cells elsewhere employ-
ing those strategies and methods already successfully experimented in the Southern
regions.
The final result being that higher proximity between organized criminal groups and
public officials has favored mafia infiltrations and its illicit activities (e.g. corruption of
public authorities, diversion of public funds, unfair competition) with obvious negative
consequences on both direct and indirect costs of innovations for knowledge intensive
firms located in Northern Italy and investing significant resources in high-risk projects.
Consistently with this backdrop, the reduction in local government size due to the
reform waves should increase the costs of innovation activities in Northern-Central
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provinces that have been more exposed to “mafiosi in confino”.
Indeed, we find evidence of a stronger detrimental effect for new established provinces
that have been more exposed to transplanted criminal cells, compared to those less ex-
posed or unexposed to them. Although other potential mechanisms may concur to
explain the reduction in innovation output identified for the new Northern-Central
provinces, we deem to have nevertheless nailed an important channel, which is at the
present still underrated, especially with regard to its international implications. In
fact, dynamics similar to those identified on the Italian territory might be at play also
in the geographical administrations of other OECD countries, where mafia-type orga-
nizations have expanded their illegal businesses (Europol, 2013; Sergi and Lavorgna,
2016).
The reminder of the paper is as follows: Sections 2 and 3 describe the related
literature and the institutional background, respectively. Section 4 informs on the
deployed estimation strategy; section 5 describes the data used and provides descriptive
statistics and evidence concerning the relationship under analysis. Section 6 reports
the discussion of our results, and section 7 concludes the paper highlighting potential
policy implications of our findings.
2 Related literature
The theoretical literature on fiscal federalism typically identifies two major advantages
of decentralization. First, decentralization is believed to improve allocative efficiency.
By being closer to the citizens, local governments have better information on their pref-
erences, and are therefore better equipped to match such preferences with adequate
services (Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, 1959; and Oates, 1972). Moreover, decentralization
supposedly gives voters more control over politicians and allows for yardstick competi-
tion, so that voters are able to infer the quality and competence of their politicians by
comparing the performance of different local governments (see Besley and Case, 1995
and subsequent literature). Second, it is argued that decentralization may increase pro-
ductive efficiency by deploying underused resources to perform better than neighbor
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jurisdictions (Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010), and therefore alleviate issues such as
waste collection and treatment in local communities. Other scholars have taken a more
cautious approach in assessing the benefits of decentralization. Prud’Homme (1995)
and Tanzi (1995), for instance, claim that decentralization exposes local governments
to greater corruption and lobbying by local interest groups, precisely because of the
proximity between such groups and local government officials.
The empirical literature has extensively studied the merits of fiscal decentralization
and its relationship with government efficiency. There is broad, yet mixed, evidence
on possible links between decentralization and corruption. Huther and Shah (1998)
find a negative correlation between the degree of expenditure decentralization and the
level of corruption, measured using a governance index for 80 developed and develop-
ing countries. However, by focusing on correlations alone, their analysis suffers from
omitted variables bias, as it disregards the many factors that could be correlated with
both decentralization and corruption. Mello and Barenstein (2001) find that decen-
tralization is negatively correlated with corruption (measured using the International
Country Risk Guide - ICRG - index),3 but that this effect depends on how subnational
expenditures are financed. In particular, they show that there is a strong negative asso-
ciation between decentralization and corruption when subnational spending is financed
with non-tax revenues. Fisman and Gatti (2002) examine a cross-country relationship
between decentralization and corruption (also measured using the ICRG index). They
find that decentralization is significantly associated with less corruption, but also that,
conditional on the degree of fiscal decentralization, being a federal country has no
significant effect on corruption. In these studies, the level of fiscal decentralization is
measured by the percentage of government expenditures made at the subnational level,
as recorded by the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics. Treisman (2000) takes a
different approach by accounting for a country federal structure. He uses an average
of various corruption indices, and a dummy variable to indicate whether a country
has a federal or unitary structure. He finds that federalist countries have higher rates
3The ICGR is published by Political Risk Services, a business risk and forecasting organization that
surveys business people and experts asking questions about levels of corruption in different countries.
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of corruption. However, Treisman (2000)’s simple measure of decentralization may
not accurately reflect the extent to which subnational governments have authority or
autonomy in decision-making. Treisman (2002), instead, uses several constitutional
indicators of decentralization (such as a dummy variable for a federal country and
the number of tiers of government) and the World Bank corruption index. His re-
sults suggest that corruption is perceived to be higher in countries with more tiers of
government.
Other studies take a broader perspective, and show that fiscal decentralization
may be positively correlated with different indicators of good government. Barankay
and Lockwood (2007) use a dataset of Swiss cantons and show that there is a positive
relationship between fiscal decentralization and education. Robalino and Picazo (2001),
Asfaw et al. (2007), Cavalieri and Ferrante (2016) find a positive association between
decentralization and health outcomes, measured by infant mortality rates.4
While the link between fiscal decentralization and government efficiency has re-
ceived wide attention, the relationship between decentralization and technological in-
novation is largely unexplored. Theorists support the idea of a positive correlation
between decentralization and innovation (see, for instance, Acemoglu et al., 2005).
Empirical evidence is so far limited to case studies, most of which do not establish a
direct link between decentralization and innovation. The case study by Drezner (2001)
represents an attempt at doing so. He tests the hypothesis that decentralized states
are better suited to fostering innovation by looking at the United Kingdom-Germany
rivalry for technological leadership in the XIX century, and at the US-Japan rivalry of
the last decades. Drezner (2001) highlights that in both cases the more centralized state
had difficulties over time to emerge as technological leader. Taylor (2007) provides a
more rigorous analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and innova-
tion. He studies whether a general correlation between innovation and decentralization
exists by using data from the European Patent Office, data on scientific publications,
4Robalino and Picazo (2001) use a panel of low- and high-income countries; Asfaw et al. (2007)
study infant mortality rates in India, while Cavalieri and Ferrante (2016) consider Italy as institutional
context.
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and high-technology exports that cover a span of 17 years. In particular, the data refer
to five of the most decentralized industrialized countries (Australia, Canada, Germany,
Switzerland, United States) and to five of the most centralized ones (Finland, France,
Great Britain, New Zealand, Sweden). Taylor (2007) shows that decentralized states
are not more innovative than centralized states. A further relevant contribution is due
to Prud’homme (2016), who uses economic decentralization theories to evaluate the
effectiveness of industrial specialization policies implemented within each of mainland
China’s 31 provinces. He finds that the Chinese system of economic decentralization
has either facilitated the technological catching-up of some provinces or led to the
deployment of risky or even likely ineffective industrial development strategies.
In our paper, we empirically assess the effect of fiscal decentralization on innovation
in the context of Italian provinces by exploiting the establishment of new provinces oc-
curred in the over 1977-2012 time period. Two papers, Barone (2011) and Caglayan et
al. (2017), are closely related to ours. Barone (2011) uses this same quasi-experiment
and finds that the creation of new provinces in 1992 has not brought any benefits in
terms of population growth, share of population that completed mandatory education,
and quality of the roads. Differently from Barone (2011), we focus on the performance
of Italian provinces in terms of innovation (i.e. number of patent applications) and
use all reform waves implemented to establish new provinces over the years. Caglayan
et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence that a greater presence of organized crime is
related to lower innovation and firms technological level during 2005-2012. Similarly
to Caglayan et al. (2017), we approximate the increase in the presence of organized
crime with the number of mafiosi in confino, i.e. individuals who were forcedly re-
settled in areas other than the municipalities of residence (from Southern to Central
and Northern Italian provinces) because convicted or strongly suspected to belong to
criminal organizations.5 Our paper differs from Caglayan et al. (2017) in at least two
elements. First, we implement a different estimation strategy, which exploits the afore-
5Buonanno and Pazzona (2014) use the number of mafiosi in confino to explain mafia transplanta-
tion to Central and Northern Italian regions; Scognamiglio (2018) uses it to analyze how the arrival
of members of crime organizations affects the local economy, and find a positive effect on employment
in the construction industry.
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mentioned quasi-experimental design and that allows for the identification of a causal
effect. Second, our main analysis is based on all Italian provinces and covers a longer
time span.
3 Institutional context
Italy has a three-tier system of territorial governance, which includes regions, provinces
and municipalities.6
According to the principles established by the Constitution, regions, provinces, and
municipalities are autonomous bodies with their own statutes, powers and functions.
Both the State and the regions exercise legislative power; but the legislative power
of regions is limited to matters not expressly reserved to the legislation of the State.
Municipalities, provinces, and regions have financial autonomy for revenues and ex-
penditure. Specifically, they establish and apply their own taxes and manage their
own income, according to the principles of coordination of public finance and the tax
system.7
At the birth of the Italian Republic there were 19 regions, which largely corre-
sponded with the territorial entities of the former Kingdom of Italy. In 1963, the
“Abruzzi and Molise” region was divided into the two regions of Abruzzo and Molise,
increasing the number of regions to 20, which has not been subject to changes.8
For about twenty years after the end of the World War II, the provincial geography
of the Italian Republic remained substantially unchanged.9 Subsequent changes in the
provincial geography occurred in 1968, in 1970 and 1974 with the establishment of
6With the term “province” we refer to the provincial administrative level labeled with the NUTS
3 code by Eurostat.
7Titolo V - Le Regioni, le Province e i Comuni http://www.governo.it/costituzione-italiana/
parte-seconda-ordinamento-della-repubblica/titolo-v-le-regionile-province-e-i.
8https://dait.interno.gov.it/territorio-e-autonomie-locali/sut/1963.pdf.
9The sole exception is the (part of the old) province of Trieste, which was reintegrated into the
Italian national territory as a result of the London Memorandum in 1954. http://freeterritorytrieste.
com/TREATIES/UN541005MEMORANDUMLONDRA.pdf.
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the provinces of Pordenone (Veneto),10 Isernia (Molise)11 and Oristano (Sardinia),12
respectively. A first major re-definition in the size and number of provinces was in-
troduced in 1992, when 8 new provinces were added to the existing 95 – Biella and
Verbano-Cusio-Ossola (Piedmont),13 Crotone and Vibo Valentia (Calabria), Lecco and
Lodi (Lombardy), Prato (Tuscany), and Rimini (Emilia Romagna).14 These new ad-
ministrations became operational in 1995. A second reform wave occurred in 2001 and
affected exclusively the territory of Sardinia, where 4 new provinces (Olbia-Tempio,
Ogliastra, Medio Campidano and Carbonia-Iglesias) were established. They became
operational in 2004 and represented the first experience of new provinces created by
regional law, which led to a series of coordination issues with the national legislation.15
The third and last major redefinition of the provincial geography occurred in 2004,
when the total number of geographical provinces increased to 110, with the inclusion
of 3 new provinces – Monza and Brianza (Lombardy), Fermo (Marche) and Barletta-
Andria-Trani (Apulia) – that became operational a few years later.16 In 2012, people
in Sardinia voted for the abolition of the 4 provinces established in 2001. The output
of this referendum had however effect only in 2016, when the province of Sud Sardinia
was created with the contextual redefinition of the province of Cagliari.17 The current
number of Italian provinces (including the metropolitan areas) is 107.
For the purpose of our study, we focus on the three main waves of reforms that
have affected the Italian provincial geography, namely the ones approved in 1992, 2001
and 2004. Since several other laws may have had an impact on the actual power and
functions of the provinces over time, in our analysis we also account for such changes
(which however applied simultaneously to all provinces at the national or regional
level).18
10https://dait.interno.gov.it/territorio-e-autonomie-locali/sut/1968.pdf.
11https://dait.interno.gov.it/territorio-e-autonomie-locali/sut/1970.pdf.
12http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:Legge:1974-07-16;306.
13http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/1992/05/08/106/sg/pdf.
14http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/1992/04/01/77/sg/pdf.
15http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/2001/07/11/27/s1/pdf.
16https://dait.interno.gov.it/territorio-e-autonomie-locali/sut/2004.pdf.
17http://consiglio.regione.sardegna.it/XVLegislatura/Leggi approvate.asp.
18See Section 4, which reports our estimation strategy.
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Over our sample period, the functions of the provinces were: protection and en-
hancement of the environment (soil, water, energy resources) and prevention of dis-
asters; enhancement of cultural heritage; transports; organization of waste disposal
(detection, discipline and control of discharges of water and atmospheric emissions);
health, hygiene and public prophylaxis services; education (including school buildings);
data collection and processing, technical and administrative assistance to local author-
ities; promotion and coordination of productive, commercial, tourism as well as social
and cultural activities.
In 2014, the Italian government approved a local government reform that has sub-
stantially redesigned the functions of provinces.19 According to the new law, several
matters provinces had competence on have been transferred to regions and municipal-
ities. However, provinces are still in charge of the territorial planning (coordination,
defense and enhancement of the environment), the planning of transport services, the
construction and maintenance of provincial roads.
4 Estimation strategy
To identify the effects of the three main reforms of provincial geography on firm innova-
tion, we deploy a difference-in-difference estimation approach. Specifically, we estimate
the following linear model:
PatAppsit = α + βtreatedi + θ1post 92t + θ2post 01t + θ3post 04t+
δtreated× postit + ηt × ξk + ui + vit.
(1)
PatApps indicates the number of patent applications at EPO, which varies over time
at the provincial level; treated is a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the
province is/will be a “new province”; post 92, post 01, and post 04 are dummy variables
indicating each post-treatment period; the interaction treated× post is our treatment
19http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/2014/04/07/81/sg/pdf.
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variable, shown in bold in model (1). We are interested in the sign and size of the
parameter δ, which informs on the treatment effect associated with the birth of new
provinces, regardless of the wave. To account for potential time-varying region specific
effects we include the interaction term η × ξ. The term u controls for time-invariant
province fixed effects, while the term v is an idiosyncratic term.
We also perform an alternative and more detailed specification of the model (1),
where both treated and the interaction treated× post are split into three components,
depending on whether we refer to the first, the second, or the third reform wave.
This more flexible specification, model (2), allows us to identify the treatment effects
associated with each reform and to capture the potential heterogeneity in their impact.
PatAppsit = α + β1treated 92i + β2treated 01i + β3treated 04i+
θ1post 92t + θ2post 01t + θ3post 04t + δ1(treated× post 92it)+
δ2(treated× post 01it) + δ3(treated× post 04it) + ηt × ξk + ui + vit.
(2)
5 Data
5.1 Data sources
We retrieve data on patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO), mea-
sured at the provincial (NUTS 3) level over the 1977-2012 time period, from the EU-
ROSTAT website “Science and Technology”.20 We are aware that using patent applica-
tions implies that only certain types of innovations, from a limited range of industries,
are taken into account. We acknowledge as well that, since a number of firms may
prefer secrecy over patenting, some of the data might not be available. On the other
hand, patent applications are subject to formal tests of novelty and non-obviousness,
and they are a good proxy of the companies’ research efforts, which often result into
20Patent statistics derive from the raw database PATSTAT, see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/
science-technology-innovation/data.
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successful innovations.
Information on the institutional change of the Italian provincial geography is ob-
tained from the website of the Ministry of the Interior.21 A careful analysis of the
anti-mafia parliamentary committee reports allowed us to collect data on the number
of convicted high-rank bosses who faced forced exile (confino) to Northern and Cen-
tral provinces until mid-70’s. As in Buonanno and Pazzona (2014) and Scognamiglio
(2018), we use the number of mafiosi in confino to identify the provinces that were
more/less exposed to the transplantation of organized crime. This measure of mafia
exposure is not free from criticism. Indeed, since it has not been kept track of every boss
who moved to the North independently, the aforementioned parliamentary reports do
not provide a comprehensive accounting on all resettlements from the historical mafia
regions (Dalla Chiesa, 2017). Although we share this concern, we deem the information
retrieved in these reports to be reliable and valuable in order to identify the areas that
have been highly exposed to the pressures and activities of criminal groups led by top
mafia bosses.
5.2 Descriptive statistics and evidence
Figures 1-3 show the geographical position of the new provinces by reform wave.
[Figures 1-3 about here]
Descriptive statistics on treated provinces by reform wave are reported in Table 1 (in
alphabetical order). Pre- and post-treatment periods are balanced around the reform
year, 7 years per time window, respectively: 1986-1992 and 1993-1999 for the 1992
reform; 1995-2001 and 2002-2008 for the 2001 reform; and 1998-2004 and 2005-2011
for the 2004 reform. A general increase in the average number of patent applications is
observable when comparing before- and after-reform periods. The provinces Monza and
Brianza and Barletta-Andria-Trani represent two extreme cases: the former experiences
an increase in the number of applications of more than 300%, whereas the latter reports
21http://www.interno.gov.it/en.
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a value of 0 applications for both periods. This is consistent with the evidence that
Southern provinces typically show a smaller raise in their innovation activities than
Northern ones.
[Table 1 about here]
A broader picture of the contribution of each province to the national innovation
outcome emerges from Table A1, which informs on the ranking (ascending order) by
average patent applications at EPO over the period 1986-2012. This table shows that
the 5 least innovative provinces are new ones, and all of them are located in Southern
Italy. The most innovative new provinces are either in Lombardy (Lecco and Monza
and Brianza are 81st and 82nd, respectively) or in Emilia Romagna (Rimini is 73rd).
Figure A1 translates into a geographical dimension what just discussed for Table A1.
It is worth noting that systematic differences between treatment (new provinces)
and control groups (old provinces) in the sample are not an issue for the implemen-
tation of the DID approach, which does require a random assignment to treatment
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008; and Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Instead, a key identify-
ing assumption is that treatment and control groups show similar trends prior to the
treatment (parallel trends assumption). We provide descriptive evidence concerning
parallel trends in Figures 4-6, which show linear fits of patent applications for both
treated (blue dots) and controls (red dots) by reform wave. Parallel trends appear to
emerge only for the 1992 reform. For the 2001 reform, non-parallel trends are par-
ticularly stark, as we observe a clear divergence in the pre-treatment values of patent
applications between the two groups of provinces. The 2004 reform also shows non-
parallel trends, it is however interesting to notice that the slope of the trend associated
with old provinces turns negative after 2004, whereas the slope associated with new
provinces becomes steeper in the after-reform period. This may suggest that the slight
divergence in the pre-treatment period is not due to an anticipation effect in terms of
innovation potential for the areas set to become provinces.
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6 Results
Our main findings are reported in Tables 2 and 3, which show the average treatment
effects carried by the interaction terms over different specifications. Table 2 reports
the average overall treatment effect (i.e., the parameter δ), while Table 3 reports the
average treatment effect by reform wave (i.e., δ1, δ2 and δ3). Standard errors are all
clustered at the provincial level, which is the unit of analysis for each observational
year in our sample period 1977-2012. In Table 2, we gradually augment the DID
specification with no control variables (base specification) either by adding further
covariates or by removing the 5 provinces that innovate the most, namely Milan, Turin,
Bologna, Rome and Vicenza. More specifically, we sequentially (a) add to the base
specification, column (i), time and province fixed effect, column (ii); (b) replace time
with region-time specific effects, column (iii); (c) exclude the top 5 performers, column
(iv). The inclusion of province fixed effects substantially improves the explanatory
power of our model, which jumps from 3% to 81% and remains relatively stable in
the subsequent specifications. The treatment effect is always negative and increases
in its numerical value when we account for time-varying region specific effects, even
though the point estimate becomes somewhat less precise. Once we exclude the top 5
performers, the coefficient estimate decreases by about a third of its size. We deem the
estimate in specification (iv) to be the most reliable, as the underlying model allows for
a better comparability between treatment and control groups. This estimate suggests
that becoming a new province may decrease the number of patent application at EPO
by about 6.5 units, as compared to the old provinces. Taking into account the already
rather low average number of patent applications observed in the Italian territory, a
reduction of this magnitude in our innovation measure is undoubtedly relevant.
[Table 2 about here]
In Table 3, we report the treatment effect by reform wave. The more flexible and
informative model is reported in column (i), where we use the same covariate set as we
did in the last specification of Table 2. Interestingly, we find that the overall treatment
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effect is driven exclusively by the 1992 reform. Indeed, the treatment effects associated
with the two more recent waves are much smaller and not statistically significant. We
find that, on average, a province created in 1992 experiences a significant decrease in the
number of patent applications of slightly more than 9.5, with respect to old provinces.
This reduction appears to be less pronounced if we shorten the time window and look
at the 1986-2012 period. The justification for this restriction is twofold. First, patent
applications at EPO are filed in more systematically from 1985 onward.22 Secondly, the
shortening of the time span improves the parallelism in pre-treatment innovation trends
between new and old provinces.23 A confounding effect might come from the potential
influence of geographical spillovers: externality effects associated with firms’ location
decisions or labor mobility are likely to affect neighbor provinces. Conceptually, these
effects may significantly bias our estimates either upward or downward, depending on
whether innovative companies or workers decide to move to/from new born provinces
from/to old ones. In order to control for such effects, we exclude neighbor provinces
from the sample and re-estimate the model in column (iii).24 It is worth noticing
that, by dropping neighbor provinces off the sample, the size of economic activity (i.e.
agglomeration economy effect), related to the split from “donor” provinces, drops as
well. After the exclusion of neighbor provinces, we find that the absolute magnitude of
the 1992 reform effect almost doubles, i.e. a province born in 1992 reduces its patent
applications by about 11 units on average, compared to an old province. This entails
that the aforementioned externality effects bias downward the estimates reported in
columns (i) and (ii).
Therefore, taking the specification related to column (iii) as our preferred one, we
now test whether such negative treatment effects are geographically heterogeneous.
Besides being relevant on its own, the rationale for this check finds roots in the his-
22See Eaton et al. (2004).
23Figures 4-6 report the same time span.
24We define as neighbor any old province sharing a border with a new one. The set of neigh-
bor provinces includes Arezzo, Ascoli Piceno, Bari, Bergamo, Bologna, Cagliari, Catanzaro, Como,
Cosenza, Cremona, Florence, Foggia, Forl-Cesena, Macerata, Milan, Novara, Nuoro, Oristano,
Pavia, Pesaro and Urbino, Piacenza, Pistoia, Potenza, Reggio di Calabria, Sondrio, Turin, Valle
d’Aosta/Valle d’Aoste, Varese, Vercelli.
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torical Italian North-South economic divide. We regress our preferred specification on
Southern-Central, column (iv), and Northern-Central regions, column (v), separately.25
Somewhat unexpectedly, it turns out that the 1992 reform effect is completely led by
Northern-Central regions. More specifically, while the parameters in column (v) are
similar to those reported in column (iii),26 no significant treatment effects are found for
Southern-Central regions, column (iv). We consider this finding as particularly relevant
because it suggests that innovation is hindered the most in more developed areas of the
country, where apparently several productive companies in new provinces lower their
innovation output, as compared to those in the control group. Conversely, innovation
activities in more depressed regions are not significantly affected by the change in the
provincial geography.
[Table 3 about here]
In this regard, it is interesting to understand the potential mechanism behind our
results, i.e. to identify what factors may have caused a reduction in innovation activities
in Northern-Central regions. Inspired by the papers studying the phenomenon of mafia
transplantation in Italy (see Buonanno and Pazzona, 2014; and Dalla Chiesa, 2017), we
test whether the exposure of provinces in Northern-Central regions to the influent mafia
bosses sent in confino may provide a partial explanation to our findings. It is worth
mentioning that highly ranked mafia bosses were sent in confino until mid-1970s (i.e.
much earlier than the start of our sample period), and that, to our knowledge, the level
of economic activity characterizing the arrival provinces was not a selection criterion
(i.e. local economic development was orthogonal to the inflow of influent mafiosi).
We look at mafia transplantation as potential mechanism because mafia activities may
contribute to increasing the cost of innovation in at least three ways: by making use of
extortions or by imposing their input suppliers to firms; by corrupting public authorities
25Northern-Central regions include: Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Lombardy,
Marche, Piedmont, Trentino Alto Adige, Tuscany, Umbria, Valle d’Aosta, Veneto. The Southern-
Central area comprises the complementary set of regions.
262001 treatment effects are not estimated for Northern-Central regions because the variation to
identify such an effect is due to Sardinia, which is a region in the complementarity subset.
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and diverting public funds; and by promoting illegal and unfair competition. Thus,
the establishment of a new province may increase the proximity of the transplanted
mafia organization to the local authority, facilitating de facto the potential corruption of
public officials or other illegal activities expected to hinder knowledge accumulation and
innovation output. In Table 4, we split provinces in Northern-Central regions in ‘above-
median’, ‘between median and 1st quartile’, and ‘below 1st quartile’ exposure to mafiosi
in confino and run our preferred specification. This sample split is somehow driven by
the number of new provinces included in each category: Lodi, Monza and Brianza in the
‘above-median’; Biella and Lecco in the ‘between median and 1st quartile’; and Fermo,
Prato, Rimini, and Vebano-Cusio-Ossola in the ‘below 1st quartile’. Consistently with
the idea that mafia transplantation increases the innovation costs, we find that the
new provinces that have been more exposed to mafiosi in confino significantly reduce
their innovation output. This reduction amounts to about 17.7 patent applications
for the ‘above-median’ category, and to about 10.7 and 1.1 for the remaining ones,
respectively. Although the estimates are not significant for the last two categories, we
find evidence of a monotonic decrease in the absolute value of the treatment effect with
respect to mafia exposure at the provincial level.
[Table 4 about here]
Finally, we report a number of robustness checks in Table 5. Specifically, columns
(i) and (ii) show placebo tests to check the robustness of our main findings to a random
assignment of the “new province” status to old provinces, maintaining the regional com-
position. This means that we treat new provinces as old ones, and some pre-existing
provinces as new ones, while making sure that the number of new provinces remains
the same within a region. We find no significant effects of placebo testing of models
(1) and (2), i.e. for pooled and by wave estimates associated with randomly assigned
treatment units. Column (iii) informs on the correlation between patent applications
and mafiosi in confino on the pre-treatment period 1986-1992. This correlation is size-
able and significantly negative, supporting the hypothesis that provinces experiencing
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mafia transplantation to a higher extent show lower levels of innovation output. Lastly,
in column (iv) we display the treatment effects from our baseline specification while
disregarding the years related to the recent economic crisis (2009-2012). These esti-
mates are in line with our main findings. Overall, the performed robustness checks
corroborate our main results.
[Table 5 about here]
7 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we shed light on the impact of decentralization on innovation by focusing
on the case of Italian provinces. More specifically, we use data on patent applications
at the EPO (measured at the NUTS 3 level), and exploit changes in the provincial
geography of the Italian territory, which occurred in different waves (1992, 2001 and
2004), to perform an empirical analysis that compares the innovation outcome between
newly established and old provinces. By means of a DID estimation strategy, which
accounts for province time-invariant and region time-varying effects as well as for inter-
province spillover confounders, we find evidence of a significant detrimental effect of
decentralization on innovation. This effect is quite heterogeneous as it varies both
geographically and by reform wave. Indeed, it turns out that whereas decentralization
significantly hinders innovation in provinces in Northern-Central regions (the more
economically active areas of the country), it does not affect innovation in Southern-
Central provinces. Moreover, we find that the decentralization effect seems to be
entirely driven by the 1992 reform, which has been though the most extensive wave as
it involved more regions than other waves did.
Although our findings may be the result of different mechanisms at play, we decided
to dig deeper in our investigation by collecting information from anti-mafia parliamen-
tary committee reports on the number of highly ranked mafia bosses who were sub-
ject to forced exile to municipalities in Northern-Central provinces. This mandatory
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resettlement-residence (‘confino’) policy that was in place until 1970’s, well before the
start of our sample period, unintentionally favored a process of mafia transplantation,
as documented in Buonanno and Pazzona (2014) and Dalla Chiesa (2017). Further-
more, assuming that the level of economic development was not a selection criterion
of the municipalities where such powerful ‘mafiosi’ were sent to, we deem reverse cau-
sation not to be an issue in our analysis. Thus, we consider mafia transplantation as
potential mechanism involved because it may had increased innovation costs through
the corruption of public authorities, the diversion of public funds, the promotion of
unfair competition, and other illicit activities. We find evidence that newly established
Northern-Central provinces that have been more exposed to mafiosi in confino suffered
higher detrimental effect of decentralization, compared to the less exposed ones. This
is consistent with the idea that corruption and collusion may be easier to organize and
enforce in smaller subnational government domains, due to the higher proximity of
public officials and various interest groups, even in areas with a relatively high level of
economic development. Therefore, the reduction in local government size due to the
reform waves may have favored the aforementioned illegal activities, increasing de facto
the mafia’s influence on the new provinces. It is worth emphasizing that the identifi-
cation of the role of mafiosi in confino does not exclude other potential complementary
mechanisms that we are not able to test in this study.
Our findings are policy relevant and provide recommendations not only to the
Italian public administration but also to the territorial governance of several European
and OECD countries that in the last decades have been widely infiltrated by mafia
groups, as documented in the Europol’s threat assessment on the Italian organized
crime (Europol, 2013). Indeed, there exist increasing evidence of an ongoing process
of transplantation on a global scale through the exploitation of foreign territories and
communities which are silently under the control of Italian mafias (e.g. see Sergi and
Lavorgna, 2016). Future studies in our agenda will shed more light on some of the
consequences of this transplantation process.
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Figure 1: New provinces – 1992 reform
Figure 2: New provinces – 2001 reform
Figure 3: New provinces – 2004 reform
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on treated by reform wave
Province Region Patent applications EPO Patent applications EPO
pre-treatment period post-treatment period
1992 reform 1986 – 1992 1993 – 1999
Biella Piedmont 2.21 4.89
Crotone Calabria 0 0.14
Lecco Lombardy 3.29 14
Lodi Lombardy 0.36 6.90
Prato Tuscany 1.71 6.26
Rimini Emilia Romagna 6.71 10.86
Verbano-Cusio-Ossola Piedmont 1.64 4.79
Vibo Valentia Calabria 0.07 0.14
2001 reform 1995 – 2001 2002 – 2008
Carbonia-Iglesias Sardinia 0 0.67
Medio Campidano Sardinia 0.36 0.14
Ogliastra Sardinia 0.14 0.07
Olbia-Tempio Sardinia 1.21 2.14
2004 reform 1998 – 2004 2005 – 2011
Barletta-Andria-Trani Apulia 0 0
Fermo Marche 0.14 3.36
Monza and Brianza Lombardy 17.07 53.55
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Figure 4: Parallel trends – 1992 reform
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Figure 5: Parallel trends – 2001 reform
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Note: Treated (blue) vs untreated (red).
Figure 6: Parallel trends – 2004 reform
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Table 2: Main results – average treatment effect
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Treatment effect -11.16** -13.24** -19.25* -6.51*
(4.86) (5.52) (11.08) (3.80)
Province FE No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No No
Region × year FE No No Yes Yes
Exclusion of top5 No No No Yes
Observations 3,960 3,960 3,960 3,780
Clusters 110 110 110 105
R-squared 0.03 0.81 0.84 0.82
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the province
level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per-
centage level, respectively. Top5 performers are Milan, Turin,
Bologna, Rome, Vicenza.
Table 3: Main results – average treatment effect by reform wave
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Treatment effect 92 -9.68** -5.76* -11.41* -0.25 -11.48*
(4.20) (3.44) (6.09) (0.21) (6.17)
Treatment effect 01 -1.11 -0.86 -0.26 -0.26 –
(0.88) (0.76) (0.20) (0.20) –
Treatment effect 04 -0.84 2.88 -4.12 -1.33 -5.74
(10.92) (11.44) (13.72) (2.85) (21.88)
1986 – 2012 time horizon No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclusion of neighbor provinces No No Yes Yes Yes
Northern-centre regions Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Southern-centre regions Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 3,780 2,835 2,133 972 1,161
Clusters 105 105 79 36 43
R-squared 0.82 0.89 0.89 0.67 0.87
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the province level. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percentage level, respectively.
All specifications include province FE and region × year FE, and exclude top5
performers (Milan, Turin, Bologna, Rome, Vicenza). Northern-centre regions
include Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Lombardy, Marche,
Piedmont, Trentino Alto Adige, Tuscany, Umbria, Valle d’Aosta, Veneto.
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Table 4: Potential explanation: mafiosi in confino among Northern-Central provinces
Above-median Between median and 1st quartile Below 1st quartile
(i) (ii) (iii)
Treatment effect 92 -17.74** -10.73 -1.11
(7.91) (9.88) (9.60)
Observations 810 351 459
Clusters 30.00 13 17
R-squared 0.90 0.88 0.92
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the province level. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percentage level, respectively.
All specifications include province FE and region × year FE, and exclude top5
performers (Milan, Turin, Bologna, Rome, Vicenza). Time horizon is 1986
– 2012. Estimates refer only to Northern-centre regions (Emilia Romagna,
Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Lombardy, Marche, Piedmont, Trentino Alto
Adige, Tuscany, Umbria, Valle d’Aosta, Veneto). New provinces in the “above-
median” sample are: Lodi, Monza and Brianza. New provinces in the “between
median and 1st quartile” sample are: Biella, Lecco. New provinces in the
“below 1st quartile” sample are: Fermo, Prato, Rimini, Vebano-Cusio-Ossola.
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Table 5: Robustness checks
Placebo checks Time horizon Time horizon
1977-1992 1986-2008
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Placebo effect 0.81
(3.99)
Placebo effect 92 -3.22
(3.85)
Placebo effect 01 0.86
(0.76)
Placebo effect 04 9.71
(13.81)
Mafiosi -0.35***
(0.13)
Treatment effect 92 -9.20*
(5.41)
Treatment effect 01 -0.06
(0.36)
Treatment effect 04 -6.71
(10.54)
Observations 2,835 2,835 960 1,817
Clusters 105 105 60 79
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.75 0.89
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the province level. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percentage level, respectively.
All specifications include province FE and region × year FE, and exclude top5
performers (Milan, Turin, Bologna, Rome, Vicenza). Time horizon in placebo
checks is 1986–2012. Placebo reform 1992 involves the following provinces:
Alessandria, Cosenza, Mantua, Novara, Pavia, Pistoia, Ravenna, Reggio di Cal-
abria. Placebo reform 2001 involves the following provinces: Cagliari, Nuoro,
Oristano, Sassari. Placebo reform 2004 involves the following provinces: Bres-
cia, Foggia, Macerata.
30
Table A1: Ranking of provinces (ascending order) by average patent applications at
EPO over 1986 – 2012
Position Province Patent applications EPO Position Province Patent applications EPO
1 Barletta-Andria-Trani 0.04 56 Latina 7.64
2 Ogliastra 0.06 57 Palermo 7.75
3 Crotone 0.20 58 Belluno 7.88
4 Medio Campidano 0.22 59 Ascoli Piceno 7.95
5 Vibo Valentia 0.27 60 Salerno 7.96
6 Enna 0.35 61 Ferrara 8.23
7 Carbonia-Iglesias 0.36 62 Prato 8.84
8 Agrigento 0.43 63 Arezzo 8.99
9 Caltanissetta 0.52 64 Vercelli 9.22
10 Oristano 0.62 65 Bari 10.29
11 Campobasso 0.73 66 Trieste 10.90
12 Trapani 0.74 67 Catania 10.92
13 Ragusa 0.85 68 Macerata 11.29
14 Nuoro 0.87 69 Piacenza 12.34
15 Syracuse 0.94 70 Chieti 12.94
16 Matera 0.96 71 Cremona 14.84
17 Olbia-Tempio 1.04 72 Perugia 14.90
18 Reggio di Calabria 1.10 73 Rimini 15.49
19 Fermo 1.17 74 Forl-Cesena 17.71
20 Grosseto 1.34 75 Napoli 18.00
21 Rieti 1.48 76 Venezia 18.39
22 Isernia 1.54 77 Siena 18.45
23 Foggia 1.61 78 Ravenna 18.74
24 Catanzaro 1.63 79 Pesaro and Urbino 18.78
25 Benevento 1.73 80 Pavia 19.78
26 Sassari 1.81 81 Lecco 20.70
27 Viterbo 1.82 82 Monza and Brianza 20.73
28 Potenza 1.87 83 Lucca 22.02
29 Avellino 1.90 84 Pisa 22.99
30 Messina 2.14 85 Trento 23.63
31 Cosenza 2.26 86 Mantua 23.83
32 Imperia 2.33 87 Bolzano/Bozen 24.24
33 Taranto 2.46 88 Cuneo 25.31
34 Sondrio 2.84 89 Novara 28.32
35 Valle d’Aosta/Valle d’Aoste 3.02 90 Alessandria 29.12
36 Massa-Carrara 3.03 91 Udine 40.54
37 Lecce 3.62 92 Como 43.10
38 Verbano-Cusio-Ossola 3.72 93 Ancona 43.11
39 Terni 4.13 94 Genoa 45.74
40 Gorizia 4.15 95 Pordenone 47.29
41 Caserta 4.32 96 Verona 48.19
42 La Spezia 4.32 97 Parma 50.30
43 Biella 4.54 98 Reggio nell’Emilia 56.40
44 Cagliari 4.58 99 Varese 58.41
45 Livorno 4.80 100 Florence 70.72
46 Rovigo 4.94 101 Padua 71.60
47 Teramo 5.18 102 Modena 79.77
48 Brindisi 5.33 103 Brescia 82.47
49 L’Aquila 5.41 104 Bergamo 85.30
50 Savona 5.43 105 Treviso 92.81
51 Pistoia 6.04 106 Vicenza 111.60
52 Pescara 6.08 107 Roma 140.97
53 Asti 6.48 108 Bologna 190.51
54 Lodi 6.60 109 Turin 257.15
55 Frosinone 7.26 110 Milan 376.11
Note: New provinces are listed in bold.
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Figure A1: Patent applications at EPO – averages by province over 1986–2012
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